THE SATURDAY EVENING POST---EXTRA.

PHILADELPHIA, SATURDAY, MAY 8, 1830.

considerable expense, we have added to our present this Supplement, containing the Report of the United States Bank, by the committee on ways and means. This report, we regard as one of the best state ers that have been promulgated during the present sessi of Congress. We believe it will be interesting to every intelligent American, who values the present as well as future welfare of his country, and wishes to ome acquainted with its financial concerns.

OF THE UNITED STATES.

CONGRESS.

Representatives. April 13, 1830.

Duffie from the Committee of s and Means, to which the sub- had been referred, made the fol

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REPORT:

committee of Ways and Means, to whom ed so much of the Message of the Presi- elates to the Bank of the United States, ve report:

they have bestowed upon the sub- the attention demanded by its in- importance, and now respectfully the result of their deliberations to sideration of the House. There subjects, having reference to the of an established government, so connected with the health of the blic, or in which the pecuniary in- of society are so extensively and involved. No one of the attributes reignty carries with it a more solemn bility, or calls in requisition a high- ee of wisdom, than the power of g the common currency, and thus mercial community, composed of ited States.

being; in the opinion of the com- he high and delicate trust exclu- mmitted to Congress by the Fede- stitution, they have proceeded to e the duty assigned to them with a ding sense of its magnitude and

most simple and obvious analysis of ject, as it is presented by the mes- the President, exhibits the follow- stions for the decision of the Na- egislature.

s Congress the constitutional power perate a bank, such as that of the States?

it expedient to establish and main- n institution?

it expedient to establish "a Nation- founded upon the credit of the ment and its revenues?"

the concurrence of all the depart- f the Government, at different pe- our history, under every adminis- nd during the ascendancy of both l political parties, into which the was divided, soon after the adop- he present Constitution, shall be d as having the authority ascribed anctions by the common consent of regulated communities, the consti- power of Congress to incorporate a ay be assumed as a postulate no pen to controversy. In a little two years after the Government operation, and at a period when he distinguished members of the Convention were either in the Ex- legislative councils of the Unit- hes of Cong over the ion. The con- Congress to pass the bank, as being precluded, in his opinion, by repeated recognitions, under varied circumstances, of the validity of such an institution in acts of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the nation." Another bill was immediately introduced, and would, in all probability, have become a law, had not the news of peace, by doing away the pressure of the emergency, induced Congress to suspend further proceedings on the subject, until the ensuing session. At the commencement of that session, Mr. Madison invited the attention of Congress to the subject, and Mr. Dallas again urged the necessity of establishing a bank to restore the currency, and facilitate the collection and disbursement of the public revenue; and so deep and solemn was the conviction upon the minds of the public functionaries, that such an institution was the only practicable means of restoring the circulating medium to a state of soundness, that, notwithstanding the decided opposition of all the state banks and their debtors, and, indeed, the whole debtor class of the community, the act, incorporating the present Bank of the United States, was passed by considerable majorities in both branches of Congress, and approved by Mr. Madison.

This brief history of the former and present bank, forcibly suggests a few practical reflections. It is to be remarked, in the first place, that, since the adoption of the Constitution, a bank has existed under the authority of the Federal Government, for thirty-three out of forty years; during which time, public and private credit have been maintained at an elevation fully equal to what has existed in any nation in the world: whereas, in the two short intervals, during which no national bank existed, public and private credit were greatly impaired, and in the latter instance, the fiscal operations of the Government were almost entirely arrested. In the second place, it is worthy of special notice, that, in both the instances in which Congress has created a bank, it has been done under circumstances calculated to give the highest authority to the decision. The first instance, as has been already remarked, was in the primitive days of the republic, when the patriots of the Revolution, and the sages of the Federal Convention, were the leading members both of the Executive and Legislative councils; and when General Washington, who, at the head of her armies, had conducted his country to independence, and, as the head of the Convention, had presided over those deliberations which resulted in the establishment of the present Constitution, was the acknowledged President of a people, undistracted by party divisions. The second instance was under circumstances of a very different, but equally decisive character. We find the very party which had so recently defeated the proposition to renew the charter of the old bank, severely schooled both by adversity and experience, magnanimously sacrificing the pride of consistency, and the prejudices of party, at the shrine of patriotism. It may be said without disparagement, that an assembly of higher talent and purer patriotism has never existed since the days of the Revolution, than the Congress by which the present bank was incorporated. If ever a political party existed, of which it might be truly said, that all the ends they aimed at were their country's," it was the republican party of that day. They had just conducted the country through the perils of a war, waged in defence of her rights and honour, and, elevating their views far above the narrow and miserable ends of party strife, sought only to advance the permanent happiness of the people.—It was to this great end, that they established the present bank.

In this review, it will be no less instructive than curious, to notice some of the changes made in the opinions of prominent men, yielding to the authority of experience. Mr. Madison, who was the leading opponent of the bank created in 1791, recommended and sanctioned the bank created in 1816; and Mr. Clay, who strenuously opposed the renewal of the charter in 1811, as strenuously supported the proposition to grant the charter in 1816.

That may be said of the bank charter, which can be said of few contested questions of constitutional power. Both the great political parties that have so long divided the country, have solemnly pronounced it to be constitutional, and there are but very few of the prominent men of either party, who do not stand committed in its favour. When, to this imposing array of authorities, the committee add the solemn and unanimous decision of the Supreme Court, in a case which fully and distinctly submitted the constitutional question to their cognizance, may they not ask, in the language of Mr. Dallas, "can it be deemed a violation of the right of private opinion to consider the constitutionality of a national bank as a question forever settled and at rest?"

And here the committee beg to be distinctly understood, as utterly disclaiming the idea of ascribing to the decision of any or of all the departments of the Government upon a great constitutional question, the binding authority which belongs to judicial precedents, in cases of mere private right, depending upon the construction of the ordinary acts of the Legislature. No length of prescription, or concurrence of authority, can consecrate the usurpation of powers subversive of public liberty, and destructive of public happiness. But, where the power exercised is clearly conducive to the public welfare, and its constitutionality is merely doubtful, it would seem to be one of the most obvious dictates of practical wisdom, to regard the decision of those who had the best means of ascertaining the intention of the Constitution, and who were actuated by the most unquestionable [illegible] authority at least to overrule theoretical objections and silence individual scruples.

The committee will now submit a few remarks, with the design of showing, that, viewing the constitutionality of the bank as an original question, the arguments in its favour are at least as strong as those against it.

The earliest, and the principal objection urged against the constitutionality of a national bank, was, that Congress had not the power to create corporations. That Congress has a distinct and substantive power to create corporations, without reference to the objects entrusted to its jurisdiction, is a proposition which never has been maintained, within the knowledge of the committee; but, that any one of the powers expressly conferred upon Congress, is subject to the limitation, that it shall not be carried into effect by the agency of a corporation, is a proposition which cannot be maintained, in the opinion of the committee.

If congress, under the authority to pass *all laws*, necessary and proper for carrying into effect the powers vested in all or any of the departments of the government, may rightfully pass a law inflicting the punishment of death, *without any other authority*, it is difficult to conceive why it may not pass a law, under the same authority, for the more humble purpose of creating a corporation. The power of creating a corporation is one of the lowest attributes, or, more properly speaking, incidents of sovereign power. The chartering of a bank, for example, does not authorize the corporation to do any thing, which the individuals composing it might not do without the charter. It is the right of every individual of the union to give credit to whom he chooses, and to obtain credit where he can get it. It is not the policy of any commercial country to restrict the free circulation of credit, whether in the form of promissory notes, bills of exchange, or bank notes. The charter of the Bank of the United States, therefore, merely enables the corporation to do, in an artificial capacity, and with more convenience, what it would be lawful for the individual corporators to do without incorporation. Mr. Girard established a bank in Philadelphia without a charter, which was in very high credit within the sphere of its circulation; and it cannot be doubted, that he might have formed a banking co-partnership with the principal capitalists in the other commercial cities of the Union, of which the bills would have had a general credit in every part of the country, particularly if the Federal Government had provided that these bills should be received in discharge of its dues. The only material particular in which the charter of the bank of the United States confers a privilege upon the corporation, apparently inconsistent with the state laws, is, the exemption of the individual property of the corporators from responsibility for the debts of the corporation. But, if the community deal with the bank, knowing that the capital subscribed is alone liable for its debts, no one can complain either of imposition or injury; and, in point of fact, no one ever has complained on that score, or ever will. The real complaint against the bank, is not that it has not sufficient basis for its credit, but that its credit is too extensive. The objection lies, therefore, not against the artificial character communicated to the stockholders by the charter, but against the pecuniary operations of the bank itself. Now, these operations consist in the use of its own capital—a faculty not surely derived from the government, but, in the exercise of which, the government imposes many useful restrictions for the benefit of itself and of the community.

The committe have presented this brief analysis of a bnk corporation, with the view of showing that there is nothing in the nature of the thing, which renders it unfit to be an instrument in the hands of a government admited to be sovereign in its appropriate sphre, for carrying into effect powers expresd delegated.

It now remais for the committee to show that the bank f the United States is a "necessary and proper," or in other words, a natural and appropriate means of executing the powers vested in the Federal Government. In the discussion of 1791, and also in that befoe the Supreme Court, the powers of raising, collecting, and disbursing the public revenue, of borrowing money on the credit of the United States, and paying the public debt were those which were supposed most dearly to carry with them the incidental right of incorporating a bank, to facilitate these operations. There can be no doubt, that these fiscal operations are greatly facilitated by a bank, and it is confidently believed that no person has presided twelve months over the treasury, from its first organization to the present time, without coming to the conclusion, that such an institution is exceedingly useful to the public finances in time of peace, but indispensable in time of war. But as this view of the question has been fully unfolded in former discussions, familiar to the house, the committee will proceed to examine the relation which the bank of the United States bears to another of the powers of the Federal Government, but slightly adverted to in former discussions of the subject.

The power to "coin money and fix the value thereof," is expressly and exclusively vested in Congress. This grant was evidently intended to invest Congress with the power of regulating the circulating medium. "Coin" was regarded, at the period of framing the constitution, as synonymous with "currency," as it was then generally believed that bank notes could only be maintained in circulation by being the true representative of the precious metals. The word "coin," therefore, must be regarded as a particular term, standing as the representative of a general idea. No principle [illegible] plain intention of the clause. If, for example, the gold bars of Ricardo should be substituted for our present coins, by the general consent of the commercial world, could it be maintained that Congress would not have the power to *make* such money, and fix its value, because it is not "coined?" This would be sacrificing sense to sound, and substance to mere form. This clause of the Constitution is analogous to that which gives Congress the power "to establish post roads." Giving to the word "establish" its restricted interpretation, as being equivalent to "fix," or "prescribe," can it be doubted that Congress has the power to establish a canal, or a river, as a post route, as well as a road? Roads were the ordinary channels of conveyance, and the term was, therefore, used as synonymous with "routes," whatever might be the channel of transportation, and, in like manner, "coin," being the ordinary and most known form of a circulating medium, that term was used as synonymous with currency.

An argument in favour of the view just taken, may be fairly deduced from the fact, that the States are expressly prohibited from "coining money, or emitting bills of credit," and from "making any thing but gold and silver a lawful tender in payment of debts." This strongly confirms the idea, that the subject of regulating the circulating medium, whether consisting of coin or paper, was, at the same time that it was taken from the control of the States, vested in the only depository in which it could be placed, consistently with the obvious design of having a common measure of value throughout the union.

But, even if it should be conceded, that the grant of power to "coin money and fix the value thereof," does not, in its terms, give Congress the power of regulating any other than the "coined" currency of the Union, may not the power of regulating any substituted currency, and especially one which is the professed representative of coin, be fairly claimed as an incidental power—as an essential means of carrying into effect the plain intention of the Constitution, in clothing Congress with the principal power? This power was granted in the same clause with that to regulate weights and measures, and for similar reasons. The one was designed to insure a uniform measure of value, as the other was designed to ensure a uniform measure of quantity. The former is decidedly the more important, and belongs essentially to the General Government, according to every just conception of our system. A currency of uniform value is essential to what every one will admit to be of cardinal importance: the equal action of our revenue system, upon the different parts of the Union. The state of things which existed when the bank was incorporated, furnished a most pregnant commentary on this clause of the constitution. The currency of the country consisted of the paper of local banks, variously depreciated. At one of the principal sea-ports the local currency was 20 per cent. below par. Now it was in vain for Congress to regulate the value of coin, when the actual currency, professing to be its equivalent, bore no fixed relation to it. This great and essential power of fixing the standard of value, was, in point of fact, taken from Congress, and exercised by some hundreds of irresponsible banking corporations, with the strongest human motives to abuse it, because their enormous profits resulted from the abuse. The power of laying and collecting imposts and excises, is expressly subject to the condition that they "shall be uniform throughout the United States;" and it is also provided, that "no preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce, or *revenue*, to the ports of one state over those of another." Now, when it is known that the circulating medium of Baltimore was 20 per cent. below the value of the circulating medium of Boston, is it not apparent that an impost duty, though nominally uniform, would, in effect, make a discrimination in favour of Baltimore, proportioned to the depreciation of the local currency? Congress, therefore, not only had the power, but, as it seems to the committee, were under the most solemn constitutional obligations to restore the disordered currency; and the bank of the United States was not only an appropriate means for the accomplishment of that end, but in the opinion of the committee, the only safe and effectual means that could have been used. This view of the subject is in full accordance with the opinion of Mr. Madison, as expressed in his message of December, 1816. "But, says he, for the interest of the community at large, as well as for the purposes of the Treasury, it is essential that the nation should possess a currency of equal value, credit, and use, wherever it may circulate. The constitution has entrusted Congress, exclusively, with the power of creating and regulating a currency of that description, and the measures which were taken, during the last session, in execution of the power, give every promise of success. The bank of the United States, under auspices the most favourable, cannot fail to be an important auxiliary."

Such are the authorities and such the arguments which have brought the committee to the conclusion, that the power to incorporate a bank is incidental to the powers of collecting and disbursing the public revenue; of borrowing money on the credit of the United States; of paying the public debt; and, above all, of fixing and regulating the standard of value, and thereby ensuring, at least so far as the medium of payment is concerned, the uniformity and equality of taxation.

II. The next question proposed for consideration, is the expediency of establishing an incorporated bank, with a view to promote the great ends already indicated. In measure, some of the considerations which render it expedient, have been slightly unfolded. But these require a more full and complete developement, while others remain to be presented.

It must be assumed as the basis of all sound reasoning on this subject, that the existence of a paper currency, issued by banks deriving their charters from the state governments, cannot be prohibited by Congress. Indeed, bank credit and bank paper are so extensively interwoven with the commercial operations of society, that, even if congress had the constitutional power, it would be utterly impossible to produce so entire a change in the monetary system of the country, as to abolish the agency of banks of discount, without involving the community in all the distressing embarrasments usually attendant on great political revolutions, subverting the titles to private property. The sudden withdrawal of some hundred millions of bank credit, would be equivalent, in its effects, to the arbitrary and despotic transfer of the property of one portion of the community to another, to the extent, probably, of half that amount. Whatever, therefore, may be the advantages of a purely metallic currency, and whatever the objections to a circulating medium partly composed of bank paper, the committee consider that they are precluded, by the existing state of things from instituting a comparison between them, with a view to any practical result.

If they were not thus precluded, and it were submitted to them as an original question, whether the acknowledged and manifold facilities of bank credit and bank paper, are not more than counterbalanced by the distressing vicissitudes in trade incident to their use, they are by no means prepared to say, that they would not give a decided preference to the more costly and cumbersome medium.

But the question really presented for their determination, is not between a metallic and a paper currency, but between a paper currency of uniform value, and subject to the control of the only power competent to its regulation, and a paper currency of varying and fluctuating value, and subject to no common or adequate control whatever. On this question it would seem that there could scarcely exist a difference of opinion; and that this is substantially the question involved in considering the expediency of a national bank, will satisfactorily appear by the comparison of a state of the currency previous to the establishment of the present bank, and its condition for the last ten years.

Soon after the expiration of the charter of the first bank of the United States, an immense number of local banks sprung up under the pecuniary exigencies produced by the withdrawal of so large an amount of bank credit, as necessarily resulted from the winding up of its concerns—an amount falling very little short of fifteen millions of dollars. These banks being entirely free from the salutary control which the bank of the United States had recently exercised over the local institutions, commenced that system of imprudent trading and excessive issues, which speedily involved the country in all the embarrassments of a disordered currency. The extraordinary stimulus of a heavy war expenditure, derived principally from loans, and a corresponding multiplication of local banks, chartered by the double score in some of the States, hastened the catastrophe which must have occurred, at no distant period, without these extraordinary causes. The last year of the war presented the singular and melancholy spectacle of a nation abounding in resources, a people abounding in self-devoting patriotism, and a government reduced to the very brink of avowed bankruptcy, solely for the want of a national institution, which, at the same time that it would have facilitated the government loans and other treasury operations, would have furnished a circulating medium of general credit in every part of the Union. In this view of the subject, the committee are fully sustained by the opinion of Mr. Dallas, then secretary of the treasury, and by the concurring and almost unanimous opinion of all parties in Congress: for, whatever diversity of opinion prevailed, as to the proper basis and organization of a bank, almost every one agreed that a national bank, of some sort, was indispensably necessary to rescue the country from the greatest of financial calamities.

The committee will now present a brief exposition of the state of the currency at the close of the war, of the injury which resulted from it, as well to the government as to the community, and their reasons for believing that it could not have been restored to a sound condition, and cannot now be preserved in that condition, without the agency of such an institution as the Bank of the United States.

The price current appended to this report will exhibit a scale of depreciation in the local currency, ranging through various degrees to twenty, and even to twenty-five per cent. Among the principal eastern cities, Washington and Baltimore were the points at which the depreciation was greatest. The paper of the banks in these places, was from 20 to 22 per cent. below par. At Philadelphia the depreciation was considerably less, though even there it was from 17 to 18 per cent. In New York and Charleston, it was from 7 to 10 per cent. But in the interior of the country, where banks were established, the depreciation was even greater than at Washington and Baltimore. In the western part of Pennsylvania, and particularly at Pittsburg, it was 25 per cent. These statements, however, of the relative depreciation of bank paper at various places, as compared with specie, give a very inadequate idea of the enormous evils inflicted upon the community, by the [illegible] Bank [illegible] position is better established, the value of money, whether i[illegible] of specie or paper, is depreciated in exact proportion to the increase of its quantity, in any given state of the demand for it. If, for example, the banks, in 1816, doubled the quantity of the circulating medium by their excessive issues, they produced a general degradation of the entire mass of the currency, including gold and silver, proportioned to the redundancy of the issues, and wholly independent of the relative depreciation of bank paper at different places, as compared with specie. The nominal money price of every article was of course one hundred per cent. higher than it would have been, but for the duplication of the quantity of the circulating medium. Money is nothing more nor less than the measure by which the relative value of all articles of merchandise is ascertained. If, when the circulating medium is fifty millions, an article should cost one dollar, it would certainly cost two, if, without any increase of the uses of a circulating medium, its quantity should be increased to one hundred millions. This rise in the price of commodities, or depreciation in the value of money, as compared with them, would not be owing to the want of credit in the bank bills, of which the currency happened to be composed. It would exist, though these bills were of undoubted credit, and convertible into specie at the pleasure of the holder, and would result simply from the redundancy of their quantity. It is important to a just understanding of the subject, that the relative depreciation of bank paper at different places, as compared with specie, should not be confounded with this general depreciation of the entire mass of the circulating medium, including specie.—Though closely allied, both in their causes and effects, they deserve to be separately considered.

The evils resulting from the relative depreciation of bank paper at different places, are more easily traced to their causes, more palpable in their nature, and consequently more generally understood by the community. Though much less ruinous than the evils resulting from the general depreciation of the whole currency, they are yet of sufficient magnitude to demand a full exposition.

A very serious evil, already hinted at, which grew out of the relative depreciation of bank paper, at the different points of importation, was its inevitable tendency to draw all the importations of foreign merchandise to the cities where the depreciation was greatest, and divert them from those where the currency was comparatively sound. If the Bank of the United States had not been established, and the government had been left without any alternative but to receive the depreciated local currency, it is difficult to

imagine the extent to which the evasion of the revenue laws would have been carried. Every state would have had an interest to encourage the excessive issues of its banks, and increase the degradation of its currency, with a view to attract foreign commerce. Even in the condition which the currency had reached in 1816, Boston, and New York, and Charleston, would have found it advantageous to derive their supplies of foreign merchandise through Baltimore; and commerce would undoubtedly have taken that direction had not the currency been corrected. To avoid this injurious diversion of foreign imports, Massachusetts, and New York, and South Carolina, would have been driven, by all motives of self defence and self interest, to degrade their respective currencies at least to a par with the currency of Baltimore; and thus a rivalry in the career of depreciation would have sprung up, to which no limit can be assigned. As the tendency of this state of things would have been to cause the largest portion of the revenue to be collected at a few places, and in the most depreciated of the local currency, it would have followed that a very small part of that revenue would have been disbursed at the points where it was collected. The government would consequently and the been compelled to sustain a heavy loss upon the transfer of its funds to the points of expenditure. The annual loss which would have resulted from these causes alone, cannot be estimated at a less sum than two millions of dollars.

But the principal loss which resulted from the relative depreciation of bad paper at different places, and its want of general credit, was that sustained by the community in the great operations of commercial exchange. The extent of these operations annually, may be safely estimated at sixty millions of dollars. Upon this sum the loss sustained by the merchants, and planters, and farmers, and manufacturers, was not probably less than an average of ten per cent. being the excess of the rate of exchange beyond its natural rate in a sound state of the currency, and beyond the rate to which it has been actually reduced by the operations of the Bank of the United States. It will be thus perceived that an annual tax of six millions of dollars was levied from the industrious and productive classes, by the large monied capitalists in our commercial cities, who were engaged in the business of brokerage. A variously depreciated currency, and a fluctuating state of the exchanges, open a wide and abundant harvest to the money brokers; and it is not, therefore, surprising, that they should be opposed to an institution, which, at the same time that it has relieved the community from the enormous tax just stated, has deprived them of the enormous profits which they derived from speculating in the business of exchange. In addition to the losses sustained by the community, in the great operations of exchange, extensive losses were suffered throughout the interior of the country, in [illegible] by the depreciated notes of [illegible] by fraudulent artifices, and having no substantial basis of capital to ensure the redemption of their bills.

But no adequate conception can be formed of the evils of a depreciated currency, without looking beyond the relative depreciation, at different places, to the general depreciation of the entire mass. It appears from the report of Mr. Crawford, the Secretary of the Treasury in 1820, that during the general suspension of specie payments, by the local banks, in the years 1815 and 1816, the circulating medium of the United States had reached the aggregate amount of one hundred and ten millions of dollars, and that, in the year 1819, it had been reduced to forty-five millions of dollars, being a reduction of fifty-nine per cent. in the short period of four years. The committee are inclined to the opinion, that the severe and distressing operation of restoring a vicious currency to a sound state, by the calling in of bank paper, and the curtailment of bank discounts, had carried the reduction of the currency, in 1819, to a point somewhat lower than was consistent with the just requirements of the community for a circulating medium, and that the bank discounts have been gradually enlarged since that time, so as to satisfy those requirements. It will be assumed, therefore, that the circulating medium of the United States has been fifty-five millions of dollars for the last ten years, taking the average.

Even upon this assumption it will follow, that the national currency has been one hundred per cent. more valuable for the last ten years, than it was in 1816. In other words, two dollars would purchase no more of any commodity in 1816, than one dollar has been capable of purchasing at any time since 1819. It is obvious, therefore, that the depreciation of the paper of particular banks, at any particular time, as compared with specie, furnishes no criterion by which to ascertain the general depreciation of the whole currency, including specie, as compared with the value of that currency at a different period. A specie dollar in 1816, would purchase no more than half as much as a paper dollar will purchase at present.

Having endeavoured to explain, thus briefly, the general depreciation resulting from a redundant currency, the committee will now proceed to point out some of the injurious consequences which have resulted from those great changes in the standard of value, which have been unavoidably produced by the correction of the redundancy.

An individual who borrowed a sum of money in 1816, and paid it in 1820, evidently returned to the lender double the value received from him; and one who paid a debt in 1820, which he had contracted in 1816, as evidently paid double the value he had stipulated to pay, though nominally the same amount in money. It is in this way that fluctuations in the quantity and value of the currency interfere, in the most unjust and injurious manner, between debtor and creditor.

And when banks have the power of suspending specie payments, and of arbitrarily contracting and expanding their issues, without any general control, they exercise a more dangerous and despotic power over the property of the community, than was ever exercised by the most absolute government. In such a state of things, every man in the community holds his property at the mercy of money making corporations, which have a decided interest to abuse their power.

By a course of liberal discounts and excessive issues for a few years, followed by a sudden calling in of their debts and contraction of their issues, they would have the power of transferring the property of their debtors to themselves, almost without limit. Debts contracted when their discounts were liberal, and the currency of course depreciated, would be collected when their discounts were almost suspended, and the currency of course unnaturally appreciated; and in this way the property of the community might pass under the hammer, from its rightful owners to the banks, for less than one half its intrinsic value. If the committee have not greatly mistaken the matter, there is more of history than of speculation in what they have here presented to the consideration of the House.

It is impossible to form any thing like an accurate estimate of the injuries and losses sustained by the community, in various ways, by the disorders and fluctuations of the currency, in the period which intervened between the expiration of the old bank charter, and the establishment of the present bank. But some tolerable notion may be formed of the losses sustained by the government, in its fiscal operations, during the war.

The committee have given this part of the subject an attentive and careful examination, and they cannot estimate the pecuniary losses of the government, sustained exclusively for the want of a sound currency, and an efficient system of finance, at a sum less than forty-six millions of dollars. If they shall make this apparent, the House will have something like a standard for estimating the individual losses of the community.

The government borrowed, during the short period of the war, eighty millions of dollars, at an average discount of fifteen per cent. giving certificates of stock, amounting to eighty millions of dollars, in exchange for sixty-eight millions of dollars, in such bank paper as could be obtained. In this statement, treasury notes are considered as stock, at twenty per cent. discount. Upon the very face of the transaction, therefore, there was a loss of twelve millions of dollars, which would, in all probability, have been saved, if the Treasury had been aided by such an institution as the Bank of the United States. But the sum of sixty-eight millions of dollars, received by the government, was in a depreciated currency, not more than half as valuable [illegible] which the stock given in [illegible] thirty-four millions, resulting, incontestibly and exclusively, from the depreciation of the currency, and making, with the sum lost by the discount, forty-six millions of dollars. While, then, the government sustained this great pecuniary loss in less than three years of war, amounting annually to more than the current expenses of the government in time of peace, it is worth while to inquire, who were the persons who profited to this enormous amount by the derangement of the currency? It will be found that the whole benefit of this speculation upon the necessities of the government was realized by stockjobbers and money brokers, the very same class of persons who profited so largely by the business of commercial exchanges, in consequence of the disorders of the currency, and who have the same interest in the recurrence of those disorders as lawyers have in litigation, or physicians in the diseases of the human frame. Having presented these general views of the evils which existed previous to the establishment of the Bank of the United States, it remains for the committee to inquire how far this institution has effected a remedy of those evils.

The first great question which arises under this branch of the inquiry is, whether or no the bank has corrected the disorders of the circulating medium, by providing a paper currency, convertible into specie at the pleasure of the holder, and of equal value with specie at all points of the Union?

The Chief Magistrate, in that part of his first message which relates to the Bank of the United States, expresses the opinion, that "it has failed in the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency." After giving to this opinion all the consideration to which it is so justly entitled, from the eminent station and high character of the citizen by whom it is entertained, the committee are constrained to express their respectful but decided dissent from it. It is true, that the bank does not, in all cases, redeem the bills issued by any one of its branches, indiscriminately at all the other branches; and it is in reference to this fact, as the committee presume, that the President expresses the opinion that the institution has failed to establish "a uniform and sound currency."

It is confidently believed, that no one of the persons who were principally instrumental in establishing the bank, ever entertained an idea that it would attempt to redeem its bills at any of its offices, other than those by which they should be respectively issued. The charter certainly contains no such requirement, and it would have been highly inexpedient if it had, to say nothing of its obvious injustice. The inevitable effect of such a requirement, would have been to compel the bank to perform the whole of the commercial exchanges of the country, without any compensation. It would not be more unjust to require a Rail Road Company to transport all the productions of the country without compensation. No institution could stand such an operation; and it was the injudicious attempt of the first direction of the bank to do it, that principally contributed to the embarrassments of 1819. A committee was appointed by the House of Representatives, in that year, to investigate the management of the bank; and in the report of that committee, as well as in the discussions to which it gave rise in the House, this attempt of the direction to redeem the bills of the institution indiscriminately, at all its branches, was indicated as one of the causes of the existing embarrassment. No one who participated in the debate, pretended to allege that the bank was bound to redeem its bills indiscriminately, or that it was expedient that it should do so. The most that any one did, was to apologise for the unwise attempt.

But it yet remains for the committee to show that this indiscriminate redeemability of the bills of all the branches of the bank, is not necessary to "the establishment of a uniform and sound currency."

Human wisdom has never effected, in any other country, a nearer approach to uniformity in the currency, than that which is made by the use of the precious metals. If, therefore, it can be shown that the bills of the United States' Bank are of equal value with silver at all points of the Union, it would seem that the proposition is clearly made out, that the bank has accomplished "the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency." It is not denied that the bills of the mother bank, and of all its branches, are invariably and promptly redeemed in specie, whenever presented at the offices by which they have been respectively issued, and at which, upon their face, they purport to be payable. Nor is it denied that the bills of the bank, and of all the branches, are equal to specie in their respective spheres of circulation. Bills, for example, issued by the mother bank, are admitted to be equal to silver in Pennsylvania, and all those parts of the adjacent states of which Philadelphia is the market. But it is contended that these bills, not being redeemable at Charleston and New Orleans, are not of equal value with silver to the merchant who wishes to purchase cotton with them, in those cities. Now, if the Philadelphia merchant had silver, instead of bank bills, he certainly could not effect his purchases with it in Charleston or New Orleans, without having the silver conveyed to those places; and it is equally certain that he could not have it conveyed there, without paying for its transportation and insurance. These expenses constitute the natural rate of exchange between those cities, and indicate the exact sum which the merchant would give as a premium for a bill of exchange, to avoid the trouble and delay of transporting his specie. It is obvious, therefore, that, even for these distant operations of commerce, silver would be no more valuable than the bills of the bank: for these would purchase a bill of exchange on either of the cities mentioned, precisely as well as silver. If the operation should be reversed, [illegible] of Louisiana [illegible] would pay the bills of the branch bank in either of those States, entirely equivalent to silver in effecting his object. Even, therefore, if the bank had not reduced the rate of the exchanges, it might be safely asserted, that its bills would be of equal value with silver at every point in the Union, and for every purpose, whether local or general.

But it is impossible to exhibit any thing like a just view of the beneficial operations of the bank, without adverting to the great reduction it has effected, and the steadiness it has superinduced, in the rate of the commercial exchanges of the country. Though this branch of the business of the bank has been the subject of more complaint, perhaps, than any other, the committee have no hesitation in saying, it has been productive of the most signal benefits to the community, and deserves the highest commendation. It has been already stated that it has saved the community from the immense losses resulting from a high and fluctuating state of the exchanges. It now remains to show its effect in equalizing the currency. In this respect, it has been productive of results more salutary than were anticipated by the most sanguine advocates of the policy of establishing the bank. *It has actually furnished a circulating medium more uniform than specie.* This proposition is susceptible of the clearest demonstration. If the whole circulating medium were specie, a planter of Louisiana, who should desire to purchase merchandise in Philadelphia, would be obliged to pay one per cent. either for a bill of exchange on this latter place, or for the transportation and insurance of his specie. His specie at New Orleans, where he had no present use for it, would be worth one per cent. less to him than it would be in Philadelphia, where he had a demand for it. But, by the aid of the bank of the United States, one half of the expense of transporting specie is now saved to him. The bank, for one half of one per cent. will give him a draft upon the mother bank at Philadelphia, with which he can draw either the bills of that bank, or specie, at his pleasure. In like manner, the bank and its branches will give draughts from any point of the Union to any other where offices exist, at a per centage greatly less than it would cost to transport specie, and in many instances at par. If the merchant or planter, however, does not choose to purchase a draught from the bank, but prefers transmitting the bills of the office where he resides to any distant point, for commercial purposes, although these bills are not strictly redeemable at the point to which they are transmitted, yet, as they are receivable in payment of all dues to the government, persons will be generally found willing to take them at par; and if they should not, the bank will receive them frequently at par, and always at a discount much less than [illegible]ange between Marseilles and P[illegible], with all the [illegible] two per cent. internal improvements [illegible] facilities afforded since is so rich, with a [illegible]ments in whizing almost exclusively of currency ever, the variation in the value [illegible] gold [illegible] three times greater *in her terror* [illegible] *of us than on our continent.* can it be said, *rightly* in this respect, the bank has not fulfilled the objects of its institution? Before its establishment, the value of bank notes, even in the commercial States, had varied twenty per cent. from each other; and, as none of them bore a fixed proportion to the precious metals, or to any natural standard, it was impossible to assign any limit to their depreciation. You have required that the currency furnished by the national bank should be every where convertible into silver, and it is so. You have expected that it should be as uniform as coin, and it is more so. He would not detain the committee by reading a paper, which he had prepared with that intention, containing the state of exchange, since the establishment of the bank, with England, France, and Holland, for he found himself occupying much more of their time than he had expected. But he believed that any member, who should turn his attention to the subject, would remark its steadiness during that period. He thought himself justified in drawing from this fact a conclusion highly [illegible]

In reference to the great depreciation of the paper of the local banks, previous to the establishment of that of the United States, he said,

"Did the interests or duty of the government of the United States permit that this currency should be received by it? Some dissatisfaction was expressed because the branch notes of the United States' Bank were at a discount of three-fourths of one per cent. He read from a price current the state of the market for bank notes, by which it appeared that notes, which were insisted to be in very good credit, varied from a discount of two and a half to one of seven, fifteen, twenty-five, and even thirty per cent. Was our revenue to be received in these notes? How were they to be employed? They might be expended in the district in which they were issued. But was the expenditure of every district to be exactly limited to its revenue? What became of the Union if it were so? He spoke of the thing, and not the name. Our Union might dissolve in imbecility as well as be destroyed by violence. Did not union imply, that the resources of one state, its money as well as its men, might be employed for the defence of another?

"But, if the government were willing to bear the loss of a depreciated and unequal currency, it must neglect the plainest principle of the Constitution in doing so—equality of taxation. The committee must well remember, that, before the establishment of the national bank, such was the unequal value of currency in the different states, that the merchants paid duties, varying fifteen per cent. from each other on the same articles."

On the question, whether the bank was bound to redeem, indiscriminately, [illegible] bills of all its branches, he said—

"He should not argue that the bank was not bound to pay its notes, indiscriminately, at all its offices. He believed that nobody now contended that it was."

* * * "It was no unfair account of the practical operation of the system of which he was speaking, to say that it gave to the branches where the exchange was unfavourable, the entire disposition of the specie of those branches where the exchange was favourable.—Upwards of six millions of specie have been sent to the branch of New York, besides the amount which has been paid by the subscribers of the bank there; but, in issuing notes which the bank of New York has been obliged to redeem, every branch throughout the country has drawn upon a fund, with whose condition at the time it could not be acquainted." * *

* * * "Such a system might be expected to produce inconvenient changes in the distribution of bank capital, an extreme facility of obtaining loans at one time, and unexpected contractions of discount at another." * * *

"Whenever the state of exchange is unfavourable, whenever the just principles of banking require a reduction of discounts, then, under this system of indiscriminate payment of its notes, the bank has nothing to fear from a draught of specie, and is encouraged to lend to every applicant. Wherever the exchange is favourable, and on the sound principles of banking, an enlarged accommodation might be given to the community—there the flow of notes from every state whose exchange is unfavourable, contracts or suspends all the operations of the bank. Thus, wherever discounts should be enlarged, the tendency of this system is to reduce them, and to enlarge them wherever they should be reduced."

Independently of the gross injustice of requiring the bank to perform all the exchanges of this extensive confederacy without any compensation, these enlightened views show most conclusively its inexpediency and injustice, as it regards the different sections of the Union. It would inevitably render those parts of the union where the bank issues were prudent and moderate, tributary to those where the issues were injudicious and excessive. In this way, the very inequality in the currency, which the bank was designed to correct, would be perpetuated by the vain attempt to make it perform impossibilities. The power of annihilating space, of transporting money or any other article to the most distant points, without the loss of time or the application of labour, belongs to no human institution.

But the salutary agency of the Bank of the United States, in furnishing a sound and uniform currency, is not confined to

that portion of the currency which c[illegible]
sists of its own bills. One of the m[illegible]
important purposes which the bank [illegible]
designed to accomplish, and which, [illegible]
confidently believed, no other hu[illegible]
agency could have effected, under our[illegible]
derative system of government, was [illegible]
enforcement of specie payments on [illegible]
part of numerous local banks, deriv[illegible]
their charters from the several states, [illegible]
whose paper, irredeemable in specie, [illegible]
illimitable in its quantity, constituted [illegible]
almost entire currency of the country[illegible]
Amidst a combination of the grea[illegible]
difficulties, the bank has almost comp[illegible]
ly succeeded in the performance of [illegible]
arduous, delicate, and painful duty. [illegible]
exceptions, too inconsiderable to [illegible]
notice, all the state banks in the U[illegible]
have resumed specie payments. T[illegible]
bills, in the respective spheres of [illegible]
circulation, are of equal value with[illegible]
and silver; while, for all the opera[illegible]
of commerce, beyond that sphere[illegible]
bills or the checks of the Bank o[illegible]
United States are even more val[illegible]
than specie. And even in the ver[illegible]
instances in which the paper of [illegible]
banks is depreciated, those banks[illegible]
winding up their concerns; and i[illegible]
be safely said, that no citizen of the[illegible]
is under the necessity of taking [illegible]
ciated paper, because a sound cu[illegible]
cannot be obtained. North Caro[illegible]
believe, [illegible] of the local banks is irredeemable [illegible]
cie, and consequently depreciated. [illegible]
there, the depreciation is only one [illegible]
per cent., and what is more importa[illegible]
paper of the Bank of the United [illegible]
can be obtained by all those who [illegible]
it, and have an equivalent to give.[illegible]
The committee are aware, that [illegible]
nion is entertained by some, that [illegible]
cal banks would, at some time or [illegible]
either voluntarily, or by the coer[illegible]
the state legislatures, have resum[illegible]
cie payments. In the very nature o[illegible]
this would seem to be an impos[illegible]
It must be remembered that no[illegible]
ever made such large dividends a[illegible]
realized by the local institutions,[illegible]
the suspension of specie payme[illegible]
rich and abundant harvest of pr[illegible]
opened to them, which the resum[illegible]
specie payments must inevitabl[illegible]
While permitted to give their ow[illegible]
bearing no interest, and not red[illegible]
in specie, in exchange for bett[illegible]
bearing interest, it is obvious, [illegible]
more paper they issued, the high[illegible]
be their profits. The most pow[illegible]
tive that can operate upon mo[illegible]
perations, would have existed, to[illegible]
the state banks from putting a[illegible]
the very state of things, from wh[illegible]
excessive profits proceeded. T[illegible]
nature must have been changed,[illegible]
before they could have been i[illegible]
to operate, voluntarily, in the r[illegible]
of the currency. It is quite as[illegible]
ble that the state legislatures w[illegible]
compelled the banks to do thei[illegible]
has already been stated that the[illegible]
of a depreciated currency [illegible]
tions to the [illegible]
produce, a
the busines
But there remains [illegible]
more general operation, which
prevented the interposition o[illegible]
legislatures to correct those i[illegible]
The banks were, directly an[illegible]
ly, the creditors of the whole [illegible]
and the resumption of specie pa[illegible]
cessarily involved a general cu[illegible]
discounts, and withdrawal of c[illegible]
would produce a general and[illegible]
pressure upon the entire class[illegible]
These constituted the largest p[illegible]
population of all the states w[illegible]
payments were suspended, and[illegible]
excessive. Those, therefore, wh[illegible]
public opinion in the states, wh[illegible]
preciation of the local paper w[illegible]
were interested in the perpetu[illegible]
evil. Deep and deleterious, [illegible]
the disease evidently was, in [illegible]
states, their Legislatures cou[illegible]
been expected to apply a reme[illegible]
ful as the compulsion of spec[illegible]
would have been, without th[illegible]
Bank of the United States.
worthy of special remark, tha[illegible]
bank has compelled the local [illegible]
sume specie payments, it has [illegible]
rially contributed, by its di[illegible]
liberal arrangements, to enabl[illegible]
so, and that with the least pa[illegible]
rassment to themselves, and [illegible]
community. If the State Le[illegible]
been ever so anxious to com[illegible]
to resume specie payments, a[illegible]
ever so willing to make the ef[illegible]
mittee are decidedly of the opi[illegible]
could not have done it, unaided[illegible]
of the United States, without [illegible]
degree of distress incompar[illegible]
than has been actually experi[illegible]
will conclude their remarks o[illegible]
of the subject by the obvious re[illegible]
if Congress, at the close of the[illegible]
it to the states to restore th[illegible]
currency, this important fun[illegible]
reignty would have been le[illegible]
from whom the Constitution h[illegible]
taken it, and by whom it could[illegible]
ficially or effectually exercis[illegible]
other idea, of considerable p[illegible]
not without its advocates. [illegible]
this government, by making th[illegible]
and continuance of specie pay[illegible]
dition upon which the state[illegible]
receive the government dep[illegible]
have restored the currency[illegible]
uniformity. Without stoppin[illegible]
reasons for believing that spe[illegible]
could not have been restored[illegible]
and that, even if they could, t[illegible]
rency of general credit, th[illegible]
Union, would not have been[illegible]
committee will proceed to giv[illegible]
for thinking that such a cons[illegible]
the Federal Government s[illegible]
banks would be exceedingly

...ts of both. While there is a Na... bound by its charter to perform ...ulated duties, and entitled to re... government deposites as a com... fixed by the law creating the ...ld only to be forfeited by the fail... from those duties, there is nothing ...cession at all inconsistent with ...pendence of the bank, and the puri... government. The country has a ...rest that the bank should maintain ...yments, and the government an ...f interest that it should keep the ...nds safely, and transfer them, free ...e, wherever they may be wanted. ...rnment, therefore, has no power ...t bank, but the salutary power of ...g a compliance with the terms of ...r. Every thing is fixed by the ...nothing left to arbitrary discretion. ...what the Secretary of the Treasu... the sanction of Congress, would ...e power to prevent the bank from ...e power unjustly and oppressively, ...punish any attempt, on the part of ...cers, to bring the pecuniary influ... the institution to bear upon the po... the country, by withdrawing the ...unt deposites from the offending ...s. But this power would not be ...ercised by the treasury, as its ex... would necessarily be subject to be ...ed by Congress. It is, in its nature, ...ery corrective, creating no undue ...ce on the part of the bank.

...if there was no National Bank, ...ion left to the discretion of the Se... of the Treasury to select the local ... which the government deposites ...e made. All the State banks ... that case, be competitors for the ... the treasury; and no one, who ...consider the nature of this sort of ..., can fail to perceive, that, in the ... an ambitious man, not possessed ...t purity and unbending integrity, ...d be imminently dangerous to the ...liberty. The State banks would ...e lists of political controversy, with ...to obtain this patronage; and very ...acity is required to foresee, that, if ...uld ever happen to be an adminis... disposed to use its patronage to ...se its power, the public funds ...e put in jeopardy by being depo... banks unworthy of confidence, and ...t extensive corruption brought to ...on the elections throughout the ...

A state of things more adverse to ...ety of the government—a power ...ible to be abused—can scarcely be ...ed. If five millions of dollars were ...e placed in the hands of the Secre... the Treasury, to be distributed at ...tion, for the purposes of internal ...ment, it would not invest him with ...angerous and corrupting power.

...nnexion with this branch of the sub... committee will briefly examine the ...t of a complaint, sometimes made ...the Bank of the United States. It ...ed that this bank, availing itself of ...rnment deposites, consisting in ...ces principally of local paper, ...great ...bar ...ver ...just ...for ...was to prevent ...ulation of local paper; and this ...n only be performed, by enforcing ...the State banks the payment of specie ...n excess in their issues. But the ...ints are induced to believe, that this ...int is principally owing, so far as it ...ists, to the fact, that the operations ...the Federal Treasury are mistaken for ...erations of the bank, because the bank ...ent by whom those operations are ...ed. This institution receives the ...rnment deposites in the paper of the ...nks, certainly in no spirit of hosti... to those banks. On the contrary, it ...to give them credit, and is designed ...ve that effect. But the Bank of the ...United States is not only bound to pay in ..., or its own bills, what it receives for ...rnment in local paper, but to trans... funds to any part of the Union, ...ere they may be required for disburse...

Let it be assumed, that the govern... collects annually, at the custom... Charleston, one million of dollars ...bank notes, and disburses in South ...s only one hundred thousand, it ...result from this, that the government ...have nine hundred thousand dollars ...bank paper deposited in the ...ston branch, which the bank would ...ed by its charter, and for the nation... it, to transfer perhaps to Wash... Norfolk. As this paper would ...ver the purposes of the government ...e places, the bank would be, of ...compelled to provide specie, or ...at will command specie at those ...

It is obvious, then, that it is the ...ity in the collection and disburse... of the revenue, that produces the ...uestion. If all the revenue collect... Charleston were disbursed in the ...drafts would be made upon the ...nks for specie. The Bank of the ...States, so far from being justly ob... to any complaint on this score, has ...mitigated the action of the treasu... the local banks, by means of the ...arrangements which its large capital ...erous branches have enabled it to ...with them. The degree in which ...stitution has reduced the rate of ex... may be fairly assumed as that in ...it has mitigated the action of the ...upon the State banks. If, for ex... there existed no national bank, and ...ceipts of the revenue collected in ...ston were made in one of the local ...what would be the effect of trans... annually, nine hundred thousand ...to Washington or Norfolk? The ...nks, having no branches at either ...places, instead of transmitting ..., as is now generally done, would ...ailed to transmit specie. The bank ...h the government deposites were ...would consequently be under the necessity of demanding specie from all the other banks, in a manner, and to an extent, much more oppressive than any thing that can be imputed to the Bank of the United States. If, to avoid these specie draughts, the local banks should purchase bills on Washington or Norfolk, they would probably cost five or six per cent. even in a tolerable state of the currency, which would be a loss to the banks almost to the full extent of the premium.

Although the expediency of renewing the charter of the present bank is not a question now submitted for the decision of Congress, the committee consider it so far involved in the matter referred to them, as to render it their duty to present some considerations bearing on that question, in addition to what they have said on the general expediency of maintaining such an institution. If a national bank, similar to the present, be a necessary and proper agent for the accomplishment of the great purposes heretofore indicated, the only remaining question would seem to be, whether the charter of the present stockholders should be renewed, or a new set of stockholders incorporated.

In considering this question, Congress will, of course, be governed in some degree, by the terms on which the present stockholders will agree to accept a renewal of their charter. But, as the committee have satisfactory reasons for believing that terms eminently advantageous to the government ... present. ... other inquiries. What then would be the effect of refusing to renew the present charter? And, in the first place, what are the inducements for pursuing that course?

It is sometimes alleged that the present stockholders are large capitalists, and, as the stock of the bank is some 20 per cent. above par, that a renewal of the charter would be equivalent to a grant to them of 20 per cent. upon their capital. It is true that a small proportion of the capital of the company belongs to very wealthy men. Something more than two millions of that owned in the United States belongs to persons holding upwards of one hundred thousand dollars each. It is also true that foreigners own seven millions, or one-fifth of the capital. But, on the other hand, it is to be remarked, that the government, in trust for the people of the United States, holds seven millions; and that persons owning less than five thousand dollars each, hold four millions six hundred and eighty-two thousand; and that persons owning between five and ten thousand dollars each, hold upwards of three millions. It is also worthy of remark, that a very considerable portion of the stock—very nearly six millions—is held by trustees and guardians, for the use of females and orphan children, and charitable and other institutions. Of the twenty-eight millions of the stock which is owned by individuals, only three millions four hundred and fifty-three thousand is now held by the original subscribers. All the rest has been purchased at the market prices—a large portion of it, probably, when those prices were higher than ... at present. ... made by wills, and *deeds, and trusts in equity, for the use of females and minors*, are believed to have been made when the stock was greatly above par. From this brief analysis, it will appear *that there is nothing in the character or* situation of the stockholders, which should make it desirable to deprive them of the advantage which they have fairly gained, by an application of their capital to purposes highly beneficial, as the committee have attempted to show to the government and people of the United States. If foreigners own seven millions of the stock of the bank, our own government owns as much; if wealthy men own more than two millions, men in moderate circumstances own between seven and eight millions; and widows, orphans, and institutions devoted to charitable and other purposes, own nearly six millions.

But the objection that the stock is owned by men of large capital would apply with equal, if not greater force, to any bank that could be organized. In the very nature of things men who have large surplus capitals are the principal subscribers at the first organization of a bank. Farmers and planters, merchants and manufacturers, having an active employment for their capitals, do not choose to be the first adventurers in a bank project. Accordingly, when the present bank went into operation, it is believed that most of the capital was owned by large capitalists, and under a much more unequal distribution than exists at present. The large amount of stock now held in trust for females and minors, has been principally, if not entirely, purchased since the bank went into operation; and the same remark is generally applicable to the stock in the hands of small holders. It is only when the character of a bank is fully established, and when its stock assumes a steady value, that these descriptions of persons make investments in it.

It is morally certain, therefore, that, if another distinct institution were created, on the expiration of the present charter, there would be a much greater portion of its capital subscribed by men of large fortunes, than is now owned by persons of this description, of the stock of the United States' Bank. Indeed, it might be confidently predicted, that the large capitalists who now hold stock in that bank, would, from their local position and other advantages, be the first to forestall the subscriptions to the new bank, while the small stockholders, scattered over the country, would be probably excluded, and the females and minors, and others interested in trust investments made by decrees in equity, would be almost necessarily excluded, as the sanction of a court could scarcely be obtained, after the passage of the new act of incorporation, in time to authorize a subscription.

To destroy the existing bank, therefore, after it has rendered such signal services to the country, merely with a view to incorporate another, would be an act rather of cruelty and caprice, than of justice and wisdom, as it regards the present stockholders. It is no light matter to depreciate the property of individuals, honestly obtained, and usefully employed, to the extent of five millions six hundred thousand dollars, and the property of the government, to the extent of one million four hundred thousand dollars, purely for the sake of change. It would indicate a fondness for experiment, which a wise government will not indulge upon slight considerations.

But the great injury which would result from the refusal of Congress to renew the charter of the present bank, would, beyond all question, be that which would result to the community at large. It would be difficult to estimate the extent of the distress which would naturally and necessarily result from the sudden withdrawal of more than forty millions of credit, which the community now enjoys from the bank. But this would not be the full extent of the operation. The bank of the United States, in winding up its concerns, would not only withdraw its own paper from circulation, and call in its debts, but would unavoidably make such heavy draughts on the local institutions for specie, as very greatly to curtail their discounts. The pressure upon the active, industrious, and enterprising classes, who depend most upon the facilities of bank credit, would be tremendous. A vast amount of property would change hands at half its value, passing under the hammer, from the merchants, manufacturers, and farmers, to the large ... capitalists, who always stand ready to avail ... of the pecuniary embarrassments of the community. The largest stockholders of the present bank, the very persons whose present lawful gains it would be the object of some to cut off, having a large surplus money capital thrown upon their hands, would be the very first to speculate upon the distresses of the community, and build up princely fortunes upon the ruins of the industrious and active classes. On the other hand, the females and minors, and persons in moderate circumstances, who hold stock in the institution, would sustain an injury, in no degree mitigated by the general distress of the community.

A very grave and solemn question will be presented to Congress, when they come to decide upon the expediency of renewing the charter of the present bank. That institution has succeeded in carrying the country through the painful process necessary to cure a deep seated disease in the national currency. The nation, after having suffered the almost convulsive agonies of this necessary remedy, is now restored to perfect health. In this state of things it will be for Congress to decide, whether it is the part of wisdom to expose the country to a degree of suffering almost equal to that which it has already suffered, for the purpose of bringing back that very derangement of the currency, which has been remedied by a process, as necessary as it was distressing.

If the bank of the United States were destroyed, and the local institutions left without its restraining influence, the currency would almost certainly relapse into ... The very pressure ... a state of ... which the present bank, in winding up its concerns, would make upon the local institutions, would compel them either to curtail their discounts at ... most needed, or to suspend specie payments. It is not difficult to ... which of these alternatives they would adopt, under the circumstances in which they would be *placed. The imperious* wants of a suffering community would call for discounts, in language which could not be disregarded. The public necessities would demand, and public opinion would sanction, the suspension, or at least an evasion, of specie payments.

But, even if this desperate resort could be avoided in a period of peace and general prosperity, neither reason nor experience will permit us to doubt, that a state of war would speedily bring about all the evils which so fatally affected the credit of the government and the national currency, during the late war with Great Britain. We should be again driven to the same miserable round of financial expedients, which, in little more than two years, brought a wealthy community almost to the very brink of a declared national bankruptcy, and placed the government completely at the mercy of speculating stockjobbers.

The committee feel warranted, by the past experience of the country, in expressing it as their deliberate opinion, that, in a period of war, the financial resources of the country could not be drawn into efficient operation without the aid of a national bank, and that the local banks would certainly resort to a suspension of specie payments. The maxim is eminently true in modern times, that money is the sinew of military power. In this view of the subject, it does appear to the committee, that no one of the institutions of the country, not excepting the army or navy, is of more vital importance than a national bank. It has this decided advantage over the army and navy: while they are of scarcely any value except in war, the bank is not less useful than either of them in war, and is also eminently useful in peace. It has another advantage, still greater. If, like the army or navy, it should cost the nation millions annually to sustain it, the expediency of the expenditure might be doubted. But, when it actually saves to the government and to the country, as the committee have heretofore attempted to show, more millions annually than are expended in supporting both the army and navy, it would seem that, if there was one measure of national policy, upon which all the political parties of the country should be brought to unite, by the impressive lessons of experience, it is that of maintaining a national bank.

It is due to the persons, who, for the last ten years, have been concerned in the administration of the bank, to state, that they have performed the delicate and difficult trust committed to them, in such a manner as, at the same time, to accomplish the great national ends for which it was established, and promote the permanent interest of the stockholders, with the least practicable pressure upon the local banks. As far as the committee are enabled to form an opinion, from careful inquiry, the bank has been liberal and indulgent in its dealings with these institutions, and, with scarcely an exception, now stands in the most amicable relation to them. Some of those institutions have borne the most disinterested and unequivocal testimony in favour of the bank.

It is but strict justice also to remark, that the direction of the mother bank appears to have abstained, with scrupulous care, from bringing the power and influence of the bank to bear upon political questions, and to have selected, for the direction of the various branches, business men in no way connected with party politics. The committee advert to this part of the conduct of the directors, not only with a view to its commendation, but for the purpose of expressing their strong and decided conviction that the usefulness and stability of such an institution will materially depend upon a steady and undeviating adherence to the policy of excluding party politics and political partizans from all participation in its management. It is gratifying to conclude this branch of the subject by stating, that the affairs of the present bank, under the able, efficient, and faithful guidance of its two last presidents and their associates, have been brought from a state of great embarrassment into a condition of the highest prosperity. Having succeeded in restoring the paper of the local banks to a sound state, its resources are now such as to justify the directors in extending the issue and circulation of its paper so as to satisfy the wants of the community, both as it regards bank accommodations and a circulating medium. Upon the soundest principles of banking, the very ample resources of the institution would justify the directors in granting accommodations to a much greater extent than they have yet done; and though they have increased the circulation of their paper from four and a half to fourteen millions, since January, 1823, they are ready and willing to increase it still further, by discounting bills of exchange and other business paper. It is believed that the discounts and issues of the institution are now actually limited by the want of applications resting upon these, the only substantial and safe foundations of bank credit and circulation.

III. Having said thus much on the constitutionality and expediency of an incorporated National Bank, the only question which remains to be examined by the committee is, the expediency of establishing "a National Bank founded upon the credit of the Government and its revenues."

It is presumed to have been the intention of the President, in suggesting the inquiry as to a bank founded upon the credit and revenues of the Government, to be understood as having allusion to a bank of discount and deposite. Such a bank, it is taken for granted, would have branches established in various parts of the Union, similar to those now established by the Bank of the United States, and co-extensive with them. The great object of furnish... ... not be ac... ing a national currency. ... *complished*,—the approach to uniformity, without the agency of such branches; and another object, second only in importance to the one just stated, the extension of the commercial facilities of bank accommodations to the different parts of the Union, could not be at all effected without such agency. If there should be simply a great central bank established at the seat of Government, without branches to connect its operations with the various points of the commerce of the Union, the promise to pay specie for its notes, whenever presented, would be almost purely nominal. Of what consequence would it be to a merchant or planter of Louisiana, or a manufacturer or farmer of Maine, that he could obtain specie for bills of the National Bank, on presenting them at the City of Washington—a place wholly unconnected either with Louisiana or Maine by any sort of commercial intercourse, and where, consequently, these bills would never come in the regular course of trade? A promise to pay specie at a place so remote from the place of circulation, and where the bills would never come but at a great expense, and for the sole purpose of being presented for payment, would neither give credit to the notes, nor operate as an effective check upon excessive issues. Whatever credit such notes might have, at a distance from the place of issue, would not be because they were redeemable at the pleasure of the holder—for such would not be the fact; but principally because of the ultimate responsibility of the Government, and of their being receivable in payment of all dues to the Treasury. They would rest, therefore, upon almost precisely the same basis of credit as the paper money of our Revolution, the assignats of Revolutionary France, and the Treasury notes of the late war.—These were receivable in discharge of debts due to the Treasury, and Government was of course ultimately responsible for their payment; yet the two former depreciated almost to nothing, and the latter, though bearing interest, sunk to 20 per cent. below par. But the notes of a central Government Bank, without branches, would be subject to depreciation from a cause which constitutes a conclusive objection to such an institution. *There would be nothing to limit excessive issues but the discretion and prudence of the Government or of the direction.* Human wisdom has never devised any adequate security against the excessive issues, and, consequently, the depreciation of bank paper, but its actual, and easy, and prompt convertibility into specie at the pleasure of the holder. Experience has shown that, where the paper of a bank is, by any means, habitually circulated at places remote from the point where it is issued, and not connected with it by a regular commercial intercourse, there will not exist that easy and prompt convertibility which is so essential to the credit of bank paper. When bank bills are confined to their appropriate sphere of circulation, a redundant issue is certainly and immediately followed by a run upon the bank for specie. This timely admonition is as useful to the bank as it is to the community: for it enables the directors to avoid, with unfailing certainty, an excess equally injurious to both, and which no human sagacity could anticipate or prevent, by calculation merely. Whatever, therefore, in a system of bank circulation, prevents the reflux of redundant issues, necessarily destroys the only adequate security against these injurious and ruinous excesses.

But a Government Bank, without branches would be obnoxious to another objection which could not be obviated. Its loans would be confined to the District of Columbia; or, if extended to the various parts of the Union—to say nothing of the inconvenience to which it would expose those at a distance who obtained accommodations—they would be unavoidably granted without any knowledge of the circumstances of the persons upon whose credit the Government would depend for re-payment. It would, in fact, be, for all useful purposes, a mere District Bank.

These views of the subject have brought the committee to the conclusion, that, if a Government Bank should be established, it would have at least as many branches as the Bank of the United States, and probably a much greater number. Few administrations would have the firmness to resist an application to establish a branch, coming from any quarter of the Union, however injudicious the location might be, upon correct principles of commerce and banking.

The Bank of the United States now employs five hundred agents, in the various parts of the Union where its offices are established. From this fact some idea may be formed of the very great addition which would be made to the patronage of the Executive Government by the establishment of such a bank as the one under consideration.

But the patronage resulting from the appointment—the annual appointment—of these agents, great as it would doubtless be, would be insignificant and harmless, when compared with that which would result from the dispensation of bank accommodations to the standing amount of at least fifty millions of dollars! The mind almost instinctively shrinks from the contemplation of an idea so ominous to the purity of the Government and the liberties of the people. No government of which the committee have any knowledge, except perhaps, the despotism of Russia, was ever invested with a patronage at once so prodigious in its influence and so dangerous in its character. In the most desperate financial extremities, no other European government has ever ventured upon an experiment so perilous. If the whole patronage of the English monarchy were concentrated in the hands of the American Executive, it may be well doubted whether the public liberty would be so much endangered by it as it would by this vast pecuniary machine, which would place in the hands of every administration fifty millions of dollars, as a fund for rewarding political partizans.

Without assuming that a corrupt use ... would be made of this ... patronage, a very slight acquaintance with the practice of all politi... tion, whatever may be their professions, will be sufficient to satisfy any reflecting mind, that all the evil consequences of corruption would flow from its exercise. Have not our political contests too frequently degenerated into a selfish scramble for the offices of the country? Are there not those who sincerely and honestly believe that these offices are legitimate objects of political warfare, and the rightful reward of the victorious party? And disinterested and patriotic as the great body of every political party is admitted to be, the fact is no less true than it is lamentable, that the most devoted and active partizans are very often mere soldiers of fortune, who watch the political signs, and enlist, at the eleventh hour, under the banners of the party most likely to prove successful. Such being, more or less, the composition of all political parties, what would be the probable use made of fifty millions of bank patronage, by a political party which conscientiously held the doctrine that all the offices in the gift of the executive should be divided among the partizans of a successful political leader? Would not the same principle be even more applicable to bank loans? and would not the Treasury of the United States, under the sanctifying influence of party delusion and party infatuation, be literally plundered, by mercenary retainers, bankrupts in fortune, and adventurers in politics?

Even if the administration should be ever so much disposed to restrain the abuse of this patronage, it would be utterly impracticable to exercise any efficient control over the great number of bank directors who would be scattered over the Union, and who, upon all the known principles of human nature, it may be confidently predicted, would principally consist of busy and officious political partizans.

Such would be the depositaries—acting, not under the public eye, but under the protecting mystery of a sort of concealment and secrecy deemed indispensable in banking operations—to whom not only the whole Treasury of the Union would be confided, to be squandered, perhaps, in profligate favouritism, but the tremendous power of putting the whole property of the nation under mortgage, for the redemption of the bills issued at their discretion. To say nothing of the utter insecurity of the public revenues under such a system, a new species of legislative power, unknown to the Constitution, would be committed to these irresponsible bank directors, of which no human sagacity can predict the consequences.

A just analysis of the operation of granting loans by this government bank, in exchange for the notes of private individuals, will show, that it involves the exercise, on the part of the directors, of the two fold power of appropriating the public revenue in the most dangerous of all forms—discretionary loans—and of pledging the responsibility of the Government to an unlimited extent, for the payment of the debts at the same time created against it. These are among the highest functions of legislative power, and have been expressly and exclusively vested in Congress. Unless, therefore, it be assumed, that Congress may rightfully transfer the powers with which it is invested to these bank directors, it will be difficult to find any warrant, either in the letter or spirit of the Constitution, for the creation of this tremendous engine of pecuniary influence. It may, indeed, be doubted, whether all the branches of the legislative authority united, have any constitutional power to lend the public revenue, either to individuals, corporations or states, without reference to the objects to which it shall be applied. But, whatever may be the power of Congress on this subject, it appears to the committee to be inexpedient, in every view of the question, that the Government should be converted into a great money lender. There is no species of trade in which it would be wise for the Government to embark; but of all the variety of pursuits known to human enterprise, that of lending money by the Government to the citizens of the country, would be fraught with the most pernicious consequences.

In the first place, it is a business to which, in the very nature of things, no Government is adapted, and, least of all, a popular Government. There is no employment of capital that requires a more vigilant and skilful superintendence. Nothing but ... ever active motive of individual interest ... exam... supply the watchfulness necessary to secure a banking institution against the grossest frauds and impositions. In pecuniary transactions, few men are to be found who will serve others, in cases involving the exercise of discretionary power, with the same fidelity that they would serve themselves; and, when we consider the strong motives, both of private friendship and political attachment, which would operate on the directors of a Government bank, to bestow its favours without impartiality or prudence, it requires but little sagacity to foresee that enormous losses would be annually sustained by the insolvency of the Government debtors.

All Governments have found it expedient to place the public Treasury under the guardianship of a high and confidential officer, aided, in the enforcement of a rigid responsibility, by a system of checks and counterchecks, operating upon all the subordinate officers concerned in collecting and disbursing the public revenue. Such is our own system. No discretion is vested in the chief officer of the Treasury, much less in those that are subordinate, in the appropriation of a single dollar of the public money. "No money can be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law." How far these wise and provident safeguards, and this constitutional barrier, would be prostrated by placing not only the public revenue, but the public credit, at the disposal of some hundreds of bank directors in various parts of the Union, is a very grave question for the consideration of the House.

Our own experience has demonstrated the great danger of having large masses of the community indebted to the government. ... deep conviction of this danger that ... to abolish the system ... of Congress ... of ... lands. Congress has been compelled to yield to the pressing importunities of the purchasers of these lands, by granting them not only repeated indulgencies, but by remitting some millions of the debt. What, then, would be the situation of the government, with a debt of fifty millions diffused throughout the country, and due to it from the most active, enterprising, and influential classes of the community? Nothing that has not happened can be more certain, than that every unfavourable vicissitude in trade, every period of commercial distress and embarrassment, would give rise to importunate and clamorous calls for indulgence, and for an injudicious extension of discounts, which no administration would have the firmness to resist. Every one who has witnessed the urgency and unanimity with which the representatives of the states, indebted for public lands, have pressed the claims of their citizens for indulgence and remission, must be satisfied, that, if the citizens of all the states should become indebted much more largely for bank loans, the government would have scarcely any faculty of resistance, when appeals for indulgence should come from all quarters of the Union, sustained by the strong plea of public distress and embarrassment.

The policy of extending indulgence to the public debtors, and of granting more liberal loans to the community, would, in the natural course of things, become the favourite theme of those who aspired to popular favour. Political parties would come to be divided upon the question of observing towards the public debtors a strict banking policy, indispensable to the maintenance of specie payments, on the one hand, or a liberal government policy, necessarily involving a suspension of specie payments, on the other. And when it is considered that the whole class of debtors, always the most numerous and active portion of the community, would be naturally in favour of increasing bank issues, and extending bank indulgences, it can scarcely be doubted that specie payments would be suspended in the first great pecuniary exigency, growing out of the embarrassments in our commerce, or deficiencies in our revenue.

The government, therefore, which is under the most sacred obligations to constrain all the banks to maintain specie payments, with a view to the uniformity and soundness of the currency, would, by its own example, perpetuate the great national evil of a fluctuating and depreciated circulating medium.

These evils, which would be so highly probable in time of peace, would be almost certain in the event of war. The temptation to supply the Federal Treasury by the easy process of bank issues, rather than resort to the unpopular process of internal taxation, would be too fascinating to

re resisted. We should thus experience, what every nation has experienced in like circumstances, the manifold evils of a mere paper currency, having no relation to any standard of intrinsic value. In these views the committee are fully sustained by the opinion of Mr. Lowndes, expressed in 1819. These are his words: "That the destruction of the (United States) Bank would be followed by the establishment of paper money, he firmly believed; he might almost say, he knew. It was an extremity from which the house would recoil, if now proposed; but if the resolutions on the table were passed, it would very soon be proposed. The subject was too large for an incidental discussion. Gentlemen thought the amount of government paper might be limited, and depreciation prevented, by the rate of interest which should be exacted. Inadequate every where, the security was particularly ineffectual in the U. States."

But the inevitable tendency of a government bank to involve the country in a paper system, is not, in the opinion of the committee, the greatest objection to it. The powerful, and in the hands of a bad administration, the irresistible and corrupting influence which it would exercise over the elections of the country, constitutes an objection more imposing than all others united. No matter by what means an administration might get into power, with such a tremendous engine in their hands, it would be almost impossible to displace them without some miraculous interposition of Providence.

Deeply impressed with the conviction, that the weak point of a free government is the absorbing tendency of executive patronage, and sincerely believing that the proposed bank would invest that branch of the government with a weight of moneyed influence more dangerous in its character, and more powerful in its operation, than the entire mass of its present patronage, the committee have felt that they were imperiously called upon, by the highest considerations of public duty, to express the views they have presented, with a frankness and freedom demanded by the occasion. It is, at the same time, due to their own feelings, that they should state unequivocally their conviction, that the suggestion of the Chief Magistrate, which they have thus freely examined, proceeded from motives of the most disinterested patriotism, and was exclusively designed to promote the welfare of the country. This is not the mere formal and heartless homage, sometimes offered up to official station, either from courtesy or interest, but a tribute which is eminently due, and cheerfully rendered, to the exalted charater of the distinguished individual on whom it is bestowed.

Extract of a letter from an intelligent merchant in Charleston, S. C. to the Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, illustrating the exchange operations of the Bank of the United States.

"This effect of diminishing the vast difference of exchange between the various points of the country, was evidently produced by the bank. The advantages produced by this institution, in the intercourse between the western and Atlantic states, can be duly appreciated by no one who sees, passive [illegible] the usual operation of the system of exchange it has created. For example: Lexington, in Kentucky, annually accumulates a large surplus of funds to her credit in Charleston, derived from the sale of horses, hogs, and other live stock, driven to that as well as to other southern markets by her citizens. Philadelphia is indebted to Charleston for exchange remitted, dividends on bank stock, &c. and Lexington is indebted to Philadelphia for merchandise. Without the transportation of a single piece of coin, Lexington draws on Charleston, and remits the check to Philadelphia, in payment of her debt there; which operation adjusts the balance between the three points of the triangle almost without expense or trouble. Could such facilities be obtained from any other than an institution having branches in different parts of the Union, acting as co-partners in one concern? Local banks, whatever might be their willingness, could not accommodate in the same manner, and to a like extent." * *

"The discounting of bills on the low terms established by the branch bank at this place, is a great benefit to the agricultural interest, particularly in enhancing the price of cotton and rice; and were the bank to stop its operations, there is no saying how far these staples would be depressed. The private dealers in exchange would take the place of the bank in that business, and their profits on bills would be taken out of the pockets of the planters, as the merchants would always regulate the price they would give for an agricultural production, by the high or low rate at which they could negociate their bills. On account of its connexion with all parts of the Union, the bank affords this important advantage to the public: it is always a purchaser and always a seller of exchange at fixed and low rates, and thus prevents extortion by private dealers." * * * * * *

"Before this bank went into operation, exchange was from eight to ten per cent. either for or against Charleston, which was a loss to the planter to that amount on all the produce of Georgia and South Carolina, and indeed you might say, all the produce of the southern and western states." * * * * * *

"If the Bank of the United States were destroyed, the local banks would again issue their paper to an excessive amount; and while a few adventurous speculators would be much benefitted by such an issue, the honest and unsuspecting citizens of our country would finally be the losers. If we look back to what took place in New York, Pennsylvania, the western states, and even in our own state, we shall see the grossest impositions committed by banks, commencing with a few thousand dollars in specie, buying up newspapers to puff them as specie-paying banks, in order to delude the public, and, after getting their bills in circulation, blowing up, and leaving the unsuspecting planter and farmer victims of a fraud, by which they were deprived of the hard earnings of years of honest industry.—But, sir, I believe the bank owes a great deal of the opposition which exists, and has existed, to the fact that it has put down these fraudulent institutions, got up by combinations and conspiracies of speculators; and who, after receiving large dividends, managed to destroy the credit of their own paper, and, by the agency of brokers, bought it up at half its nominal value.

"Since I last wrote you, I had a conversation with a gentleman in the confidence of some of the monied men of the north, and he says they are determined to break up the United States' Bank, to enable them to use their money to advantage; as that institution gives so many facilities to the com[illegible] their [illegible] profits."

"*There is another consideration:* the distress would be immense, which a refusal to renew the charter would produce among those who are indebted to the institution: for I find that to this branch, the planters owe upwards of a million of dollars; and I have no hesitation in saying as safe a debt as is owing to any bank in the Union. But if the bank should wind up its affairs, these planters could not get credit from other institutions; and as the bank can sue in the United States' Court, where judgment is obtained almost at once, property would be greatly depressed, and monied men would buy it up for half its value. Throughout the Union all classes would suffer, except those who should hold up their money to go into the brokerage business, or buy property at a sacrifice. If I were sure the bank would not be re-chartered, I would convert my property into money, with a view to dealing in exchange. I could make a vast fortune by it."

APPENDIX, No. 3.

LIST of Transfers directed by the Secretary of the Treasury from and to Bank United States and Offices, from 6th June to 14th December 1829.

No.	Date.	Where from	Where to.	Amount.
No. 1	June 8, 1829	New York - -	Washington - -	100,000
2	" "	Bank United States -	Ditto - -	50,000
3	" "	New York - -	Ditto - -	150,000
		Ditto - -	Bank United States -	1,865,000
		New Orleans - -	Ditto - -	75,000
		Louisville - -	Ditto - -	50,000
		Cincinnati - -	Ditto - -	115,000
		Bank United States -	Baltimore - -	135,000
		Ditto - -	Norfolk - -	80,000
		Ditto - -	Fayetteville - -	20,000
		Ditto - -	Charleston - -	200,000
		Ditto - -	Savannah - -	15,000
		Ditto - -	Mobile - -	35,000
		Portland - -	Portsmouth - -	20,000
		Ditto - -	Boston - -	90,000
		New York - -	Ditto - -	40,000
		Providence - -	New York - -	140,000
		Hartford - -	Ditto - -	35,000
		New York - -	Richmond - -	70,000
		Ditto - -	Charleston - -	80,000
		Cincinnati - -	Pittsburgh - -	15,000
31	July 8, "	New York - -	Washington - -	100,000
32	Aug. 3, "	Ditto - -	Ditto - -	100,000
33	" "	Baltimore - -	Ditto - -	50,000
	Sept. 1, "	New York - -	Ditto - -	100,000
	9, "	Louisville - -	Pittsburgh - -	20,000
	" "	Charleston - -	Fayetteville - -	10,000
	" "	Bank United States -	Norfolk - -	20,000
	" "	New York - -	Ditto - -	20,000
	" "	Louisville - -	Nashville - -	20,000
44	14, "	New York - -	Washington - -	100,000
45	" "	Boston - -	Ditto - -	40,000
47	21, "	Charleston - -	Fayetteville - -	20,000
49	Oct. 5, "	New York - -	Norfolk - -	50,000
50	12, "	Ditto - -	Washington - -	100,000
51	Nov. 2, "	Bank United States -	Norfolk - -	50,000
52	" "	New York - -	Washington - -	100,000
63		Boston - -	Ditto - -	50,000
65		Bank United States -	Norfolk - -	50,000
64		New York - -	Washington - -	100,000
65		Ditto - -	Norfolk - -	50,000
66		Ditto - -	Washington - -	100,000
67		Bank United States -	Ditto - -	100,000
68		Boston - -	Ditto - -	25,000
69	Dec. 14, 1829	Ditto - -	Bank United States -	500,000
70	" "	New York - -	Ditto - -	1,000,000
71	" "	New Orleans - -	Ditto - -	400,000
72	" "	Bank United States -	Baltimore - -	300,000
73	" "	Ditto - -	Charleston - -	50,000
74	" "	Savannah - -	Norfolk - -	50,000
				$7,055,000

From the above statement, the annual amount of the transfers made for the Government free of expense, may be inferred.

STATE OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, APRIL 1, 1830.

Notes discounted - - - - - - - -	$32,158,270 89
Domestic bills discounted - - - - - -	10,506,888 54
Funded debt held by the bank - - - - -	11,182,550 90
Real estate - - - - - - - -	2,891,690 75
Funds in Europe, equal to specie - - - -	2,789,498 54
Specie - - - - - - - -	9,043,748 97
Public deposites - - - - - - -	8,905,501 87
Private deposites - - - - - - -	7,704,256 87
Circulation - - - - - - - -	*16,085,894 00

*This is the circulation from the office returns. We know, however, that a part of it is received at other offices, and is in passage from one to the other. So that the nett circulation is $14,176,927.

APPENDIX No. 1.—*PRICES CURRENT exhibiting a comparative view of the relative value of Bank Notes in 1816 and in 1829 at the principal commercial cities and various other places.*

At Bank of the U. States	Boston. 1816. July 1.	Boston. 1829. Dec. 5.	New-York. 1816. July 1.	New-York. 1829. Dec. 5.	Philadelphia. 1816. July 1.	Philadelphia. 1829. Dec. 5.	Baltimore. 1816. July 1.	Baltimore. 1829. Dec. 5.	Washington. 1816. July 1.	Washington. 1829. Dec. 5.	Richmond. 1816. July 1.	Richmond. 1829. Dec. 5.	Norfolk. 1816. July 1.	Norfolk. 1829. Dec. 5.	Charleston. 1816. July 1.	Charleston. 1829. Dec. 5.	Savannah. 1816. July 1.	Savannah. 1829. Dec. 5.
Office Portland	par																	
Portsmouth	par																	
Boston	par																	
Providence	par																	
Hartford	par																	
New York	par																	
Baltimore	par																	
Washington	par																	
Richmond	par a ½																	
Norfolk	par a ½																	
Fayetteville	par a ½																	
Charleston	par a ½																	
Savannah	par a ½																	
Mobile	par a ½																	
New Orleans	par a ½																	
St. Louis	par a ½																	
Nashville	par a ½																	
Louisville	par a ½																	
Lexington	par a ½																	
Cincinnati	par a ½																	
Pittsburgh	par a ½																	
Buffalo	par a ½																	
Bank U. States	par																	
Lexington Bk.	par a ½																	
Kentucky Bk.	par a ½																	
Exchange Bk.	par																	
Union Bk.	par																	
Farmers' Bk.	par																	
Hartford Bk.	par																	
Merchants' Bk.	par																	
Bank of Com.	par																	
Bank of Metrop.	par																	
Mechanics' Bk.	par																	
Franklin Bk.	par																	
Bank of Penn.	par																	
Farmers' Bk.	par																	
Bank of Md.	par																	
Bank of Balt.	par																	
Union Bk.	par																	
Farmers' Bk.	par																	
Bank of Alex.	par																	
Bank of Va.	par																	
Farmers' Bk.	par																	
Bank of Fred.	par																	
Bank of Wash.	par																	
Bank of Geo.	par																	
Bank of Augusta	par																	
Bank of Darien	par																	
Bank of Ala.	par																	
Bank of Mobile	par																	
Bank of Orleans	par																	
Bank of Louisa.	par																	
Bank of Kentucky	par																	
Bank of Com.	par																	
Bank of Tenn.	par																	
Miss. Bk.	par																	
Bank of Ohio	par																	
Miami Exp. Co.	par																	
Bank of Chillicothe	par																	
Bank of Cincinnati	par																	
Lancaster Bk.	par																	
Bank of Steubenville	par																	
Bank of Wooster	par																	
Bank of Gallipolis	par																	
Bank of Marietta	par																	
Bank of Zanesville	par																	
Bank of Pittsburgh	par																	
Bank of Gettysburg	par																	
Bank of Chambersburg	par																	
Bank of Middletown	par																	
Bank of Harrisburg	par																	
Bank of Lancaster	par																	
Bank of Erie	par																	
Bank of Northumb.	par																	
Bank of Wilkesbarre	par																	
Bank of Susquehanna	par																	
Bank of Easton	par																	
Bank of Delaware	par																	
Bank of Wilmington	par																	
Bank of Newcastle	par																	
Bank of Smyrna	par																	
Bank of Dover	par																	
Bank of Georgetown	par																	
Bank of Somerset	par																	
Bank of Havre de Grace	par																	
Bank of Chester	par																	
Bank of Chester Co.	par																	
Bank of Montgomery	par																	
Bank of Norristown	par																	
Bank of Germantown	par																	
Bank of Reading	par																	
Bank of Pottsville	par																	
Bank of Lewistown	par																	
Bank of Carlisle	par																	
Bank of Chambersburg	par																	
Bank of Gettysburg	par																	
Bank of Hagerstown	par																	
Bank of Frederick	par																	
Bank of Westminster	par																	
Bank of Cumberland	par																	
Bank of Wheeling	par																	
Bank of Virginia	par																	
Bank of Fredericksburg	par																	
Bank of Petersburg	par																	
Bank of Virginia	par																	
Bank of Dis. Colum.	par																	
Bank of Potomac	par																	
Bank of Alexandria